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Farmers’ Rights 
Daniel Webster stated: 
Let us never forget that the cultivation of the earth is the most 
important labor of man . . . .  When tillage begins, other arts follow.  
The farmers, therefore, are the founders of human civilization.1
The rise of intellectual property rights afforded to plant varieties 
and breeders has come at the expense of the farmers’ rights to save, 
use, exchange, and sell seed.  These traditional farmers’ rights have 
given way to breeders’ rights by the grant of utility patent protection 
to sexually produced plant varieties in the U.S. and in Europe.  In 
response, the countries possessing the vast majority of plant genetic 
diversity have asserted sovereign rights over the plant material within 
their borders.2  Ironically, this assertion of sovereign rights in the 
name of “farmers’ rights” extends patent-like protection to all plant 
material not already held as common heritage by international seed 
banks.  The condition of “farmers’ rights” in the International Treaty 
on Plant Genetic Resources (ITPGR) effectively prohibits farmers’ 
rights to save seed. 
Farmers have been, and continue to be, the end users of plant 
varieties, but are also an important part of the innovation cycle of 
plant variety development.  Since agriculture began, farmers have 
bred plants through mass seed selection.3  Steve Brush explained, 
“[t]he exchange of seed among farmers and the lack of explicit 
proprietary rules governing specific crop types, traits, or germplasm 
appear[ed] to be common to agriculture before the 20th century, and it 
remains the dominant approach to seed management for the large 
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1 HARVEST:  AN ANTHOLOGY OF FARM WRITING 101-02 (Wheeler McMillen, ed., 
1964).  Webster made his comments in an address on January 14, 1840 at the Boston State 
House.  Neil D. Hamilton, Feeding Our Future:  Six Philosophical Issues Shaping 
Agricultural Law, 72 NEB. L. REV. 210, 257 n.218 (1993). 
2 See Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, Preamble 1, 1760 U.N.T.S. 76, 
available at http://www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2005) (entered 
into force on Dec. 23, 1993) [hereinafter CBD]. 
3 See Mark Hannig, An Examination of the Possibility to Secure Intellectual Property 
Rights for Plant Genetic Resources Developed by Indigenous Peoples of the NAFTA 
States:  Domestic Legislation under the International Convention for Protection of New 
Plant Varieties, 13 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 175, 185 (1996). 
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majority of farmers around the world.”4  “Both farmer seed exchange 
and international crop germplasm flows evolved originally as 
common heritage regimes, allowing free exchange of plant genetic 
resources among seed banks, researchers, and farmers.”5  The 
exchange of crop material among farmers within and between 
communities and diffusion of domesticated plant varieties has been 
“ubiquitous throughout human history” and a necessary part of 
agriculture.6  Even farmers in the (Vavilov) centers of crop diversity 
depend on the exchange of plant material from seed banks in 
developed countries.7  Plant varieties do not suffer from a tragedy of 
the commons.8  Instead, their conservation depends upon farmers 
developing the varieties and those varieties being broadly used. 
The rise of private and public breeders and the ensuing concerns 
over intellectual property rights is a relatively recent phenomenon. 
The science of modern plant breeding developed after Leibig’s 
postulate of nitrogen, phosphate and potassium as the basic 
elements of plant nutrition, after Darwin’s natural selection theories, 
and after Gregor Mendel’s work on applied genetics was 
rediscovered in 1900.  As agricultural external inputs intensified in 
response to technological development that changed farming 
practices, so did the need for plant development to meet the effects 
of those inputs[.]9
Prior to the rediscovery of Mendel’s work, farmers themselves 
were responsible for the development of plant varieties.  In the green 
revolution, seeds were recognized as technological delivery systems.  
Plant varieties bred for local needs that were resistent to native pests 
and diseases were replaced with so called “high yielding varieties” 
 
4 Stephen B. Brush, The Demise of ‘Common Heritage’ and Protection for Traditional 
Agricultural Knowledge 11, available at http://law.wustl.edu/centeris/ 
confpapers/PDFWrdDoc/StLouis1.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2005) (paper prepared for 
conference on biodiversity, biotechnology, and the protection of traditional knowledge, St. 
Louis, Mo, April 4-5, 2003). 
5 Rudiger Wolfrum, The Principle of Common Heritage of Mankind, 43 HEIDLEBERG J. 
INT’LL. 312 (1983). 
6 Keith Aoki, Weeds, Seeds & Deeds:  Recent Skirmishes in the Seed Wars 11, 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 247, 261 (2003). 
7 See Brush, supra note 4, at 15. 
8 James O. Odek, Bio-Piracy:  Creating Proprietary Rights in Plant Genetic Resources, 
2 J. INTEL L. PROP. L. 141, 149 (1994).  The tragedy of the commons is “the situation in 
which unowned and unmanaged common resources are available to all, with the 
consequence that entrants crowd onto these resources, overusing them and underinvesting 
in their maintenance and improvement.”  Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property:  
Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 
129 (1998). 
9 Hannig, supra note 3, at 185 (citation omitted). 
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requiring a concomitant package of synthetic fertilizers and chemical 
crop protectants.10
Sixty-five years of congressional activity protected the farmer’s 
right to save, use, exchange, and sell seed.11  Luther Burbank, 
iconoclast breeder of hundreds of varieties of vegetable and tree fruit, 
developed the Burbank Russett Potato from a potato berry picked 
from his grandmother’s garden and was credited for contributing $14 
billion to the U.S. economy in the first decade of the 20th century.  
But he never received a royalty on his plant invention.12  His appeal 
gave rise to the Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA).13  The PPA only 
extended to asexually propagated plants, not seed plants, and 
ironically not potatoes.  Recognizing the obstacles patent monopolies 
would pose to farmers, the Senate clarified “the patent right granted is 
a right to propagate a new variety by asexual reproduction.  It does 
not include the right to propagate by seeds.”14
In 1965, a presidential commission reviewed the role of plant 
patents and concluded that patents did not fall into §101 subject 
matter for utility patents.  The commission focused directly on the 
question of patenting sexually reproducing plants and stated: “While 
the [Commission] acknowledges the valuable contribution of plant 
and seed breeders, it does not consider the patent system the proper 
vehicle for the protection of such subject matter, regardless of 
whether the plants reproduce sexually or asexually.”15
In 1968, Congress proposed an amendment to insert the words “or 
sexually” in sections 161 and 163 of the PPA.  The amendment was 
 
10 The “green revolution” was a term coined by U.S. Agency to International 
Development director William Gaud to describe a movement to increase yields using new 
crop cultivars in concert with irrigation, fertilizers, pesticides, and mechanization.  See 
THE NORMAN BORLANG INSTITUTE FOR PLANT SCIENCE RESEARCH, THE GREEN 
REVOLUTION & DR. NORMAN BORLANG:  TOWARDS THE “EVERGREEN REVOLUTION,” at 
http://www.agbioworld.org/biotech_info/ topics/borlaug/green-revolution.html (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2005). 
11 Joseph Mendelson III, Patently Erroneous:  How the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision 
in Farm Advantage Ignores Congress and Threatens the Future of the American Farmer, 
32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10698 (2002). 
12 See Cary Fowler, The Plant Patent Act of 1930:  A Sociological History of its 
Creation, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 621, 639 (2000). 
13 Townsend-Parnell Plant Patent Act of 23 May 1930, Pub. L. No. 245 (71st 
Congress). 
14 S. REP. NO. 71-315, at 4 (1930); H.R. REP. NO. 71-1129, at 1 (1930). 
15 Report of the President’s Commission on the Patent System, To Promote The 
Progress of Useful Arts In An Age Of Exploding Technology 1-3 (1966). 
Farmers’ Rights 475 
                                                       
defeated.16  Congress again refused to extend patent protection to 
sexually propagated plants. 
Instead, in 1970, Congress specifically crafted a new and distinct 
intellectual property regime for sexually reproducing plants—the 
Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA).17  The PVPA was created in the 
wake of the Southern Corn leaf blight that devastated as much as 50 
percent of the corn crop in the south (a blight attributed to genetic 
uniformity).  With the PVPA Congress created a sui generis statute 
extending patent-like protection to sexually propagated seed plants, 
while carefully preserving a farmer’s right to save seeds.18
The PVPA is distinct from a utility patent in two important ways: 
(1) it preserved a farmer’s right to save, use, exchange, and sell seeds; 
and (2) it provided for a research and breeding exemption allowing 
breeders or farmers to use any protected variety to develop a new 
variety.19  Finally, plant variety protection certificates are issued by 
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), not the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).20
The USDA opposed granting utility patents to sexually 
reproducing plants because such patents would threaten continuing 
development and introduction of new seed varieties.21  More 
specifically, the USDA feared that seed patenting would severely 
limit free data exchange, restrict open research discussion, and 
diminish the exchange of experimental plants.  The USDA argued 
that extending utility patents to sexually reproducing plants was 
scientifically and legally unsound in that such plants could not be 
reproduced true to type or be reasonably capable of identification.22
In 1985, an administrative agency dismissed sixty-five years of 
congressional effort.  The PTO’s Board of Patent Appeals ruled in Ex 
parte Hibberd that a corn plant containing an increased level of the 
amino acid tryptophan was patentable subject matter.23  In 2000, in 
 
16 See Plant Variety Protection:  Hearings on H.R. 13424, H.R. 13631, H.R. 14332, 
H.R. 15226, H.R. 13901 Before the Subcomm. on Departmental Operations of the House 
Comm. on Agriculture, 91st Cong. 10 (1970). 
17 Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (codified as 
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (2000). 
18 See id. 
19 “The use and reproduction of a protected variety for plant breeding or other bona fide 
research shall not constitute an infringement of the protection provided under this [act].”  
Id. § 2544 (2000). 
20 See id. §§ 2481-2486. 
21 Mendelson, supra note 11. 
22 Id. 
23 227 U.S.P.Q. 443 (Bd. of Patent App. and Interferences, 1985). 
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J.E.M. v. Pioneer, the Supreme Court made Hibberd the law of the 
land and extended the scope of utility patents to sexually produced 
plants.24  Justice Thomas, who wrote the opinion, left the attorney 
general’s office in 1977 and became a corporate lawyer in the 
pesticide and agriculture division of the Monsanto Company.25  When 
J.E.M. was being decided, Monsanto held over a thousand plant 
patents that stood to be overturned.  Justice O’Connor, an outspoken 
critic of expansive intellectual property rights, recused herself in the 
J.E.M. decision because her family had fiduciary relationships with 
DuPont, who owned a significant share of Pioneer.26
In the wake of those decisions, a handful of corporations spent 
more than thirty-four billion dollars in mergers and acquisitions.  In 
2000, Monsanto purchased Holden Foundation Seeds for one billion 
dollars, the remaining 60 percent of DeKalb Genetics, Asgrow, 
Agracetus, and Cargill’s seed division.  Monsanto acquired or 
obtained an interest in DeKalb (1998), Calgene (1997), Asgrow 
(1996), First Line Seeds Limited (1998), Holden’s Foundation Seed 
(1997), Plant Breeding International (1999), Agracetus, and Ecogen.  
DuPont paid $7.7 billion to acquire the remainder of Pioneer, making 
DuPont the world’s largest seed company.  Novartis, the merger of 
Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz, purchased Northrup King, Rogers Seed Co., 
Funk Seeds International, and then merged with Astra Zeneca to form 
Syngenta.27
As a result of extending utility patents to sexually produced plants, 
the farmer and research exemptions of the PVPA—the right to save 
seeds and the right to use any protected variety to develop new 
varieties—were eliminated.  Furthermore, farmers would now be 
subject to liability for patent infringement, not only if they saved 
patented seed, but also if they saved seed contaminated by patented 
pollen from neighboring fields. 
Internationally, during the negotiations over the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) Treaty of 1992, the notion of a farmer’s 
right, as the right to save seeds and use protected varieties to develop 
new varieties, gave way to a new definition of “farmers’ rights.”  
Because of concerns of increasing “breeders’ rights” through utility 
patents and concerns of “biopiracy” (the “unidirectional and 
 
24 J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001). 
25 Nathan W. Dean, The Primacy of the Individual in the Political Philosophy and Civil 
Rights Jurisprudence of Justice Clarence Thomas, 14 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L. J. 27, 
30-31 (2004). 
26 Mendelson, supra note 11, at 10702.  
27 Id. at 10706. 
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uncompensated appropriation” of genetic resources), farmer 
advocates introduced the notion of “farmers’ rights.”  In 1988, the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 
defined Farmers’ Rights as “rights arising from the past, present and 
future contributions of farmers in conserving, improving, and making 
available plant genetic resources, particularly those in centres of 
origin/diversity.”28  Gone were the rights to save, use, exchange, and 
sell seed.  Instead, those rights were replaced by implied intellectual 
property rights attributable to farmers in diversity centers. 
This distinction between farmers in the North and the South 
ignores the common activities and concerns of farmers worldwide.  A 
more appropriate distinction would be between farmers large and 
small.  “For example, small farmers often save seed from one 
season’s crop rather than purchasing seed, whereas large-scale 
farmers often purchase their seed annually.”29  “Small farmers 
develop land races as they select seed and allow the accidents of open 
pollination to occur within their fields.  They also work in an 
environment that incorporates both domesticated and wild species to 
ensure agricultural sustainability.”30  Finally, small and family 
farmers in the North and South face similar pressures from increasing 
agriculture concentration and commodification of agricultural 
production resources. 
Due to pressure from developing countries’ well-intentioned non-
profit organizations, the common heritage principle has given way to 
a divided ownership regime to plant genetic resources.31  In article 15 
of the CBD, farmers’ rights became synonymous with governments’ 
sovereign rights over their plant genetic diversity.32  Consequently, 
governments may charge farmers royalties for the use of any potential 
plant varieties derived from within their borders.  In line with the 
 
28 Farmers’ Rights, FAO Conf. Res. 5/89, 25th Sess., FAO (Nov. 1989), available at 
Ftp://ext-ftp.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/Res/C5-89E.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2005). 
29 Hannig, supra note 3, at 181, citing Kevin Dahl & Gary Paul Nabhan, From the 
Grassroots Up: The Conservation of Plant Genetic Resources by Grassroots 
Organizations — “Latter Day Noahs” of North America, in DIVERSITY, Vol. 8, No. 2, 
1992 at 28. 
30 Hannig, supra note 3, at 191.  See generally J. J. Hardon, Biotechnology, Plant 
Breeding and Resource-poor Farmers in the Third World, in HANS BROUWER ET AL., 
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND FARMER’S RIGHTS:  OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS FOR SMALL 
SCALE FARMERS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 73, 76 (1992); LAWRENCE BUSCH ET AL., 
PLANTS POWER AND PROFIT:  SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND ETHICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
NEW BIOTECHNOLOGIES 58 (1991). 
31 Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of 
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 35 (2004).  
32 CBD, supra note 2, at 9. 
478 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 19(2), 2004] 
                                                       
CBD, the ITPGR33 limited the common heritage treatment of plants 
to those varieties already held by international seed banks and placed 
intellectual property rights on all plant materials not yet in the seed 
banks.34 The farmers’ right to save seed was suddenly transformed 
into intellectual property rights for all varieties held by a country, 
despite the varieties lack of distinctness, uniformity, or stability.  This 
led to Otto Frankel’s comment: “[A] litigious world community 
insisting on sovereign rights to what evolved long before the 
beginnings of civilization is likely to lose in the long run what it tries 
to exploit in the short run.” 
The task of resurrecting farmers’ rights to save, use, exchange, and 
sell farm-saved seed is daunting because it goes to the heart of the 
problems within the PTO.  In theory, a simple international registry 
where farmers, breeders, and curators could characterize a variety 
would establish that variety as prior art and defeat any subsequent 
patent claims for lack of novelty.  However, in practice the PTO has 
granted patents on plants known to be traditional varieties. 
In lieu of congressional action to narrow the scope of the utility 
patent, farmers are left with a limited common heritage and liability 
for exercising their former rights to save, use, exchange, and sell seed. 
Thomas Jefferson, the father of the U.S. patent system once said, 
“[t]he greatest service which can be rendered [by] any country is to 
add a useful plant to its culture[.]”35  One of his worst fears was the 
creation of a patent system that allows the “granting of monopolies 
which might withhold technological progress . . . from the general 
public.”36
 
 
33 See International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Nov. 
3, 2001, available at ftp://ext-ftp.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/it/ITPGRe.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 
2005). 
34 Otto H. Frankel, Genetic Resources:  Evolutionary and Social Responsibilities, in 
SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY 19, 44 (Jack R. Kloppenburg, Jr. ed., 1988). 
35 THE GARDEN AND FARM BOOKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 509 (Robert C. Baron ed., 
1987).  
36 Joshua C. Benson, Resuscitating the Patent Utility Requirement, Again:  A Return to 
Brenner v. Manson, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 267, 296 (2002), quoting SILVIO A. BEDINI, 
THOMAS JEFFERSON STATESMAN OF SCIENCe 207 (1990). 
